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  11. Introduction 
Sir Edward Coke remarked as early as the 16
th century that ‘there is no jewel in 
the world comparable to learning’. This jewel has in recent decades grown and been 
extended to many more people as the post-war period has witnessed an impressive 
improvement of schooling in much of the world. Average schooling rates of people in 
Western Europe and North America have increased dramatically and even more 
impressive increases have happened in the Asian tiger economies. This accumulation of 
education has had advantageous effects, first and foremost by leading to faster 
economic development as proposed by the endogenous growth literature (Barro, 1997; 
Topel, 1999; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002). In addition, schooling is often considered 
an indispensable component of social and human development, as e.g. in the United 
Nations’ Human Development Index (UNDP, 2003). Hence, the importance of 
accumulating education, one would think, would create a demand for and interest in 
research in the reasons for such differences, yet the literature has not received the same 
attention as that of growth (see Hanushek, 1986; Hanushek and Luque, 2003).  
In addition to the standard argument that countries in various ways invest in the 
broad extension and quality of education, the explanation seems to be that countries 
with low schooling rates catch up, i.e. achieve faster growth of schooling. However, two 
supplementary explanations are offered by the recent surge in research on the concept of 
social capital, which is usually defined as ‘features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). Putnam argued that social trust – itself 
defined by Fukuyama (1995, p. 153) as arising when ‘a community shares a set of moral 
values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest behavior’ - 
  2is created through repeated interactions in voluntary organizations. In other words, 
individuals learn to trust each other by meeting and interacting on a voluntary basis, for 
example in schools. Yet, subsequent studies have questioned this mechanism. Knack 
and Keefer (1997) note that the correlation between trust and network measures in a 
country sample disappears when controlling for education while Uslaner (2002) finds 
neither empirical evidence of this association nor proper theoretical arguments why 
particularized trust emerging in face-to-face interactions should carry over into trust 
towards strangers. In addition, recent studies find that trust and networks have 
substantially differing consequences. For example, Zak and Knack (2001) and 
Beugelsdijk, de Groot & van Schaik (2004) find that trust is robustly related to growth 
while Knack (2003) finds only mixed support for Putnam’s notion that voluntary 
organizational activity affects growth and Bjornskov (2006) shows that the association 
between social capital and governance is entirely due to trust. There is thus mounting 
evidence suggesting that social capital consists of diverse elements while virtually all 
studies find some association between one or more of these elements and education.  
The original work on social capital by James Coleman (1988) indeed focused 
exclusively on its connection to educational outcomes.
1 Entitled ‘Social capital in the 
creation of human capital’, the study argued that communities rich in trust and social 
connections achieve low rates of high school drop outs. Coleman suggested that this 
association between social and human capital was first and foremost an effect of family 
social capital, i.e. that children in families with strong bonds between children and 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, Coleman was not the first to employ a social capital concept. The work of Bourdieu 
(1986) is an example of a Marxian-inspired approach that differs markedly from the current social capital 
paradigm while earlier contributions of e.g. Jacobs (1961) and Loury (1977) hardly can be said to have 
had an impact comparable to that of Coleman’s work. 
  3adults have easy access to adults’ human capital (see also Teachman, Paasch & Carver, 
1997). Children in such environments would therefore be more likely to succeed in 
education. Coleman, however, also touched upon social capital outside the family in the 
form of children’s access to the human capital of non-kin adults and found evidence of 
effects arising from both types of social capital on the likelihood of dropping out of high 
school. Social capital in this form thus has public goods aspects that are only accessible 
in communities where people trust that others will return favours such as helping their 
children. More recently, Putnam (2000, p. 301) therefore finds reason to stress the 
overriding importance of trust in a sample of American communities, noting that ‘even 
communities with many material and cultural advantages do a poor job of educating 
their kids if the adults in those communities don’t connect with one another’. These 
findings extend to cross-country comparisons where la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schleifer & Vishny (1997) likewise find that the effect of trust on schooling outcomes is 
quite strong, showing that a one-standard deviation increase in social trust raises the 
percentage of a population graduating from high school by about one half of a standard 
deviation.  
Conversely, a number of other studies have argued for the reverse causality. The 
work by Knack and Keefer (1997) notes the correlation between levels of social trust 
and schooling and interprets it as an effect going from human to social capital. Such 
effects are intuitively easy to interpret as noted by the authors. Higher learning implies 
that individuals become better informed and better at interpreting perceived 
information, as well as becoming more conscious of the consequences of actions taken 
by themselves and others. Furthermore, schooling has a socialization effect, which 
along the lines of Putnam could induce individuals to trust and engage in voluntary 
  4organizational activity. Alternatively, Gradstein and Justman (2000) model the process 
as one in which social cohesion reduces rent seeking, which strengthens incentives for 
investments in human capital. Social cohesion, in turn, is affected by investments in 
public education that this way comes to affect the accumulation of social capital.  In 
addition, Zak and Knack (2001) also note that trust may proxy for subjective time 
preference rates, which would influence decisions regarding investments in education. 
A number of other studies relying on simple OLS estimates have found similar effects 
of schooling (e.g. Schneider, Teske, Marschall, Mintrom & Roch, 1997; Knack and 
Zak, 2002; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006).  
These alternatives are not necessarily strict substitutes, but for policy purposes, it 
may be necessary to know the relative strength of each causal direction, as policy 
implications differ in the two extremes. If trust causes schooling growth, and not vice 
versa, the simple implication is that investments in education may be cheaper in high-
trust societies. Moreover, this connection might explain part of the growth effect 
documented by recent studies (e.g. Zak and Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004). In 
the other extreme where schooling causes trust, investing in education is equally 
expensive in all countries, all other things being equal, yet have the additional external 
effect of raising trust levels. In the first case, returns to investments in education may be 
equal but costs are lower in high-trust countries, while the latter case would imply that 
low-trust countries have higher returns to such investments, given that there are 
decreasing returns to social trust. The causal links are therefore of immediate policy 
relevance as well as being an unresolved research question. The main finding of this 
paper - that social trust exerts a robust and causal influence on the growth rate of 
  5schooling - therefore contradicts previous literature suggesting that education is a 
determinant of trust and also leads to different policy implications.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical link 
between social trust and the growth of schooling. Section 3 describes the data while 
Section 4 uses them to test the theoretical explanations in a set of cross-country 
regressions. Section 5 concludes and draws some implications of the findings. 
 
2. An alternative link between social trust and schooling  
Two different views on the connection between social and human capital have 
been introduced by previous literature. An alternative third explanation of why social 
trust could lead to improved schooling builds on the potential effects of trust on search 
costs in labour markets. While it posits a causal relation going from social trust to 
schooling, it differs from the Coleman explanation in focussing on the demand for 
education where previous research has focussed on the supply. In short, the argument is 
that when interpersonal trust and honesty is low in society, employers will be highly 
exposed to hiring employees who lack the social skills needed to cooperate efficiently 
and thereby reap the full gains of their human capital. Employers will therefore tend to 
put relatively more emphasis on direct information obtained from trustworthy sources 
on job applicants’ social skills and relatively less emphasis on formal qualifications 
such as education, as a way of hedging the risk of getting a ‘bad’ employee. This 
reaction comes about as employers may not be able to monitor educated workers 
without considerable cost due to the complexity of their work tasks. Such rational 
reactions to poor general quality of information benefits the employer but has the 
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educated labour, thereby lowering the general level of education in society. 
However, this paper does not focus on levels but the on improvements of 
schooling during the last four decades. With respect to the theoretical explanations 
above, it is worth noting that only one of the three may entail a real association between 
social trust and the growth of schooling. Knack and Keefer’s (1997) notion that human 
capital spurs the development of social capital suffers from an inability to explain the 
apparent persistence of social trust as well as specific outcomes related to trust. For 
example, if schooling growth led to increasing trust levels, one would also expect to see 
corruption levels converge over time, which is not the conclusion of most studies. In 
addition, trust levels as measured by the World Values Surveys since 1981 seem to be 
rather stable across time despite the substantial improvements in schooling (Uslaner, 
2002; Volken, 2002). Likewise, Coleman’s (1988) account of the association would 
imply a weak link between social capital and human capital growth, as rapidly 
increasing levels of education would render the education of adults potentially obsolete. 
Conversely, the alternative search costs view proposed here also implies that as the 
demand for formal skills increases – as has certainly been the case with the post-war 
period move towards knowledge-intensive production – high-trust societies will 
experience faster accumulation of education, all other things being equal, as firms’ costs 
of hiring educated employees are lower in such societies. This mechanism can be 
formalized in the following simple way. 
The model consists of an economy with many identical firms and workers who 
share their time between work and education. Assume that uneducated individuals 
receive the wage w0 (which acts as a numeraire in the model) while educated individuals 
  7receive a wage w1 that depends on the level of their education, l. In the long run, the 
level of education naturally reacts to the wage, as individuals can observe the demand of 
education from firms’ behaviour. The response of education to wages, dl / dw1, thus 
represents a supply side effect, which firms take into account, and optimal supply of 
education is therefore determined within the model. Since firms use both educated and 
uneducated workers, they have two options. Firms can choose to employ uneducated 
individuals on whom they have good information, for example only hiring those whom 
they personally know to be ‘willing’ to work. These workers can furthermore be 
monitored easily and at relatively low cost, given their typical work tasks. Alternatively, 
firms can employ individuals with education, which involves risk, as not all individuals 
are trustworthy in the sense that they can be expected to do their job efficiently. This 
choice is more costly, as the performance of educated workers is likely to be 
substantially more difficult and costly to measure given the higher complexity of their 
work tasks. The model therefore posits two types of educated workers, differing with 
respect to their trustworthiness, and different monitoring costs between uneducated and 
educated workers. For simplicity, it is assumed that uneducated workers can be 
monitored at negligible cost while the costs of monitoring educated workers are 
prohibitive in a specific sense outlined below.
2  
                                                 
2 The standard theoretical solution in principal-agent models is monitoring (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). Building in this option in the model would nevertheless only complicate it without altering the 
qualitative implications. It should furthermore be stressed that there need not be a systematic difference 
between the trustworthiness of educated and uneducated individuals. Given the costs of monitoring and 
obtaining information, trustworthiness simply becomes more important when employing educated 
workers as uneducated workers are easily monitored. 
  8With trustworthiness comes a set of social skills such as an ability to cooperate, as 
this type typically reciprocates favours and acts according to society’s fairness norms 
(e.g. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman & Soutter, 2000; Uslaner, 2002; Guerra and Zizzo, 
2004). The untrustworthy type is less likely to reciprocate and respond to trust, which 
makes cooperation more difficult and lowers labour productivity.
3 As such, assume that 
each trustworthy educated individual produces bl
α units of the output where α>0 and 
b>1 measures the technological sophistication of production. Untrustworthy individuals 
are less productive, producing the fraction σ<1 of that of trustworthy educated 
individuals, while uneducated individuals produce 1 unit in what can be thought of as a 
complementary production facility. As trustworthiness is unobservable, firms 
employing educated employees thus experience an adverse selection problem that 
provides a further incentive to acquire information on the trustworthiness of potential 
employees.  
Total production y of a representative firm in any period is given by equation 1, 
which is a slightly modified Cobb-Douglas production function, where m and n are the 
shares of employees with and without education, respectively (time subscripts are 
dropped for simplicity). Firms maximize the present value of profits π in equation 2 
where c is the cost of ascertaining the trustworthiness of any individual and θ is the 
                                                 
3 The question of whether trust and trustworthiness improves productivity is explored by Knack and 
Keefer (1997) who found that trust is strongly associated with labour productivity. Related research also 
suggests that high-trust countries might have higher total factor productivity (TFP), all other things being 
equal. Becker and Murphy (1992) suggest that coordination between different tasks might well be defined 
by non-economic considerations while Grafton, Knowles and Owen (2002) find significant relations 
between TFP, labour productivity and various measures of social divergence that are strongly related to 
social trust. 
  9share of all workers that are screened for their social skills. For this purpose, the model 
assumes the existence of a technology or institution that at a fixed price can reveal the 
trustworthiness of agents and supply a trustworthy agent, and the term θmc thus 
represents a transaction cost associated with hiring new employees. As in Zak and 
Knack (2001), the model focuses on the starkest case, the one-shot transaction without 
individual-specific information. The notion that firms can reveal such characteristics of 
employees only at a cost is related to the similar theoretical role of investment brokers 
in Zak and Knack (2001). The sense in which monitoring of educated workers is 
prohibitively costly can now be clarified: the profit loss from employing untrustworthy 
educated workers that are less productive (by σ), plus the costs of revealing their 
trustworthiness (c) borne by firms must not exceed the potential monitoring costs for 
screening to be the optimal solution to adverse selection. A further implicit assumption 
is thus that trustworthy workers are not able to send signals of trustworthiness that 
cannot be easily imitated by untrustworthy individuals; i.e. such signals are reduced to 
pure cheap talk. 
The parameter ω in equation 3 is the probability that an educated individual 
selected at random is trustworthy and therefore becomes the social trust parameter of 
the model by capturing the trust employers in general have in their fellow citizens. 
Average trustworthiness φ of educated employees is hence determined by the 
distribution of the two types within the firm. Finally, i is an investment in new labour-
augmenting technology that raises the value of the b-parameter and hence the content of 
education in production. Consequently, equation 4 is the equation of motion for 
technology where b-1 is technology lagged one period and µ defines the effectiveness of 
investments. 
  10 
  () () 1 ym b l n
β α δ ϕϕ σ ⎡ =+ − ⎣⎤ ⎦        ( 1 )  
  10 yw mw n m ci π θ =− − − −         ( 2 )  
  () 1 ϕ ωω =+−θ          ( 3 )  
  1 bb i µ − =+          ( 4 )  
 
Assume for simplicity that the relation between m and n need not be the same 
within firms as in society as a whole. Any public and service sectors thus serve only two 
purposes in the long run: they swallow any potential unemployment and satisfy firms’ 
demand for education so as to equate m with the actual share of the population holding 
an education.
4 With an interest rate r, solving infinitely-lived firms’ profit maximization 
problem with respect to m, n, w1, θ and i yields a set of first order conditions that 
determine e.g. the wage paid to educated workers. Imposing the assumption that the 
economy is characterized by imperfect competition in the sense that all firms take a 
mark-up of γ and combining this with the system above yields the steady state level of 
schooling in the appendix. From this follows a set of implications including a unique 
balanced growth path and investment level as well as a growth path of schooling in 
equation 8. The temporal properties of schooling with respect to social trust as set out in 
equation 9 comprise the main focus of the remainder of the paper. Note that ŷ denotes 
the growth rate of y, i.e. changes in y over y; the same notation is used for l. 
 
                                                 
4 See the appendix for a relaxation of this assumption. 
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The set of equations above has four main implications: i) that income is 
proportional to the level of technology in production, i.e. that income growth depends 
on investments in technology; ii) that the investment ratio i/y is constant and dependent 
on market structure; iii) that schooling levels converge, due to the Solow-type 
assumptions of the model; and iv) that the resulting growth of schooling depends 
positively on the level of trust, ω.
5 This last implication arises from the effect of social 
trust on the transaction costs associated with revealing the trustworthiness of potential 
employees, an effect related to the approach in Zak and Knack (2001). As usual, the 
theoretical model only shows the implications of a possible transmission channel. While 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that even though the model has the appearance of a closed economy, the degree of 
monopolistic competition captured by the mark-up γ is likely to decrease with increasing openness to 
foreign competition. The investment rate in equation 6 as well as the  steady state growth rate in equation 
7 can therefore be argued to depend positively on openness as is standard (e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992; 
Wazciarg, 2001). Note also that at very low levels of trust steady state growth of schooling may be 
negative, i.e. eventually resulting in a poverty trap similar to that found in Zak and Knack (2001); see the 
appendix for further discussion. 
  12the validity of this specific assumption can only be ascertained in individual- or firm-
level studies, it is the implication at the macro-level that is tested in the following. 
 
3. Data  
The aim of the following section is to establish whether the latter implication 
holds when confronted with data. The data for estimating the relation between the 
growth of schooling and social trust are drawn from various sources; see appendix 
Table A1 for sources and Table A2 for descriptive statistics. The variables of particular 
interest are four measures of schooling and a measure of social trust. Firstly, the average 
length of schooling for adults over 25 years of age and the same measure for females are 
used to capture effects on total education. Secondly, the percentage of the population 
with a secondary education is employed as a first measure of higher education since 
mandatory primary schooling requirements in some countries may potentially obfuscate 
the effect of trust. Thirdly, the percentage of the population with a tertiary education, 
i.e. college undergraduate degrees and higher, is entered. As such, it should be possible 
to ascertain the effects of trust on various degrees of education.
6  
As the preferred measure of social trust, the generalized trust scores from the 
World Values Survey project are employed. The measure is the average of all available 
observations for each country from three waves of the survey conducted in 1981, 1990-
                                                 
6 A potential reason for not being able to distinguish between the four indicators is that education 
measures are often highly correlated. In the present sample, the correlation between the growth rates of 
average total schooling and average female schooling is 0.93 while the correlation between the former 
and the growth of secondary education is 0.76 and none of the measures are significantly associated with 
tertiary education. Hence, an alternative interpretation of the use of different indicators is to see it as a 
robustness test of a general claim. 
  1393, and either 1995-97 or 1999-2000; the appendix reports the trust scores for all 
countries included. Previous research has shown that this is a well-functioning measure 
of average trustworthiness and honesty, which is remarkably stable over time (Uslaner, 
2002; Volken, 2002), although some authors question its validity. Fine (2001, p. 105), 
referring to the concept of social capital in which trust is an important component, for 
example considers that given that it ‘is context-dependent - and context is highly 
variable by how, when and whom, then any conclusion [reached by empirical studies] 
are themselves illegitimate as the basis for generalisation to other circumstances’. 
Nevertheless, Knack (2001) reports the results of an experiment in which a number of 
wallets were dropped in cities around the world, a test that may be particularly suited to 
reveal people’s trustworthiness as returning a wallet is an entirely private decision, 
being unobservable by the legal system. Contrary to Fine’s conjecture, the national trust 
scores turn out to be good predictors of how many wallets in each country were returned 
with the contents intact. Another indication of the validity of this measure is that social 
trust is a robust cross-country determinant of aggregate behavioral features such as 
corruption or the prevalence of violent crime (Lederman, Loayza & Menéndez, 2002; 
Uslaner, 2002). National scores of social trust hence seem to measure the extent to 
which people in a country can in general be expected to ‘do the right thing’ in a variety 
of contexts.  
Glaeser et al. (2000) and Carpenter (2002) moreover note that in experiments, 
individual trust scores appear to be a reasonably good measure of respondents’ own 
trustworthiness and hence whether respondents themselves can be expected to do the 
  14right thing.
7 However, even at the individual level it is difficult to separate trust and 
trustworthiness. Deutsch (1958, p. 268) defined trustworthiness as implying ‘that the 
trustworthy person is aware of being trusted and that he is somehow bound by the trust 
which is invested in him’ and found that trust and trustworthiness were strongly related 
in experimental behavior. Experimental work on trust responsiveness has also 
questioned the distinction between trust and trustworthiness by supporting Deutsch’s 
implication, showing that trusters are indeed more likely to reciprocate trust, i.e. to be 
trustworthy (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Guerra and Zizzo, 2004). Likewise, Ahn 
and Ostrom (2002, p. 21) treat social trust as ‘a baseline expectation of other’s 
trustworthiness […which] reflects the average level of trustworthiness in society’. 
Hence, for trust and trustworthiness to differ at the national level, individuals not only 
have to form systematically wrong expectations of fellow citizens’ trustworthiness, but 
also need to continue to do so. As this seems highly unlikely, the social trust scores are 
therefore treated as a reflection of both average trust and trustworthiness in the 
following. As a final point to note, social trust is measured in the last half of the period 
considered below. However, the national trust scores seem to have been rather stable 
throughout the period in which the WVS has measured them, indicating that the time of 
measurement may not be a problem (Uslaner, 2002; Volken, 2002).  As such, the 
                                                 
7 The much-quoted work by Glaeser et al. (2000) indicates that social trust does not have any influence on 
the amount sent by the first mover in ultimatum games. However, it must be stressed that these 
experiments are not anonymous and that subjects in a number of cases were allowed to choose whom to 
play with. The results in the Glaeser paper therefore refer to particularized trust instead of generalized or 
social trust. As such, the finding that measures of trust and trustworthiness are not related in the 
experiments is likely to be a reflection of the rather weak association between the two types of trust. 
  15variable used in the following may not be ideal but nonetheless provides a relatively 
reliable and valid proxy for the ω in the model.  
In the next section, GDP per capita and the initial 1960 level of schooling enter as 
control variables in all regressions while a subset of the analyses also include regional 
dummies covering Latin America, the post-communist countries, Asia and the Pacific, 
North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The section additionally 
includes a robustness test by extreme bounds analysis (EBA) as introduced by Leamer 
(1985) and popularized by Levine and Renelt (1992). The pool from which variables are 
drawn for the EBA includes the initial fertility rate, openness to trade, market 
distortions, income inequality, democratic tenure, population density, governments’ 
share of the economy, expenditure per student, GDP growth, average intelligence (IQ), 
and governance; appendix Table A1 lists the definitions and sources and Table A2 gives 
descriptive statistics. The rationales for entering these variables are as follows. i) High 
initial fertility could be expected to affect schooling growth negatively as families with 
many children may tend to invest less in education due to being income or credit 
constrained. Fertility may also proxy for age structure as high fertility means a large 
share of young people, which Berggren and Jordahl (2006) find to be negatively 
associated with social trust. ii) Increased international competition could create demand 
for skilled labour and investments in education as a way of increasing competitiveness, 
which would imply a positive association between the growth of schooling and 
openness to trade, captured by either openness or a direct measure of market distortions 
deriving from Forbes (2000) that is related to the degree of integration in the world 
market. iii) Income inequality could lead to lower investments in education, as 
particularly poor people may not invest as much due to credit constraints (e.g. Perotti, 
  161993; Barro, 2000). Inequality is also strongly negatively associated with social trust 
(Uslaner, 2002), which thus could give rise to a spurious effect. On the other hand, 
wage inequality could create incentives to invest in education (see e.g. Topel, 1997). iv) 
Democratic systems may invest more in education to the extent that voters demand it 
and may also be associated with higher trust (Uslaner, 1999); hence the number of years 
in the period that a country has been democratic enters the pool. v) Population density 
may proxy for transaction costs that are particularly high in scarcely populated countries 
where pupils need to travel a significant distance to get to school. Given that a number 
of such countries have relatively low trust scores this might give rise to a spurious 
effect. vi) Governments’ share of GDP proxies for the generosity of welfare, which may 
make it less risky to take an education, but could also reduce the incentives to take an 
education. As some authors also connect social trust and features of welfare state, this 
could produce a spurious effect (Rothstein, 2003). vii) Expenditure per student naturally 
measures actual investments in education and thus captures a supply side effect. If trust 
captures a ‘solidarity’ effect this might for example be reflected in educational 
spending. vii) Trust may proxy for growth, since a number of studies find that social 
trust is an important determinant of economic growth (Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 
2001; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004). Growing wealth may in turn have affected the level of 
schooling, or might simply create a spurious correlation between trust and schooling as 
both are correlated with economic growth. ix) Weede and Kämpf (2002) argue that 
some level of intelligence is a prerequisite for education, i.e. it could also be expected to 
influence the growth of schooling. IQ might also pick up family effects as suggested by 
Coleman (1988). Finally, x) the social capital literature in general finds that social trust 
is associated with the quality of formal institutions and governance (Knack and Keefer, 
  171997; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004). As schooling growth could possibly depend on the 
functioning of institutions, a measure of governance is included.
8
 
4. Empirical results 
Turning to the empirical association between schooling growth and social trust, a 
first indication of the notion brought forward by this paper can be seen in Fig. 1 that 
plots trust levels against the growth of average schooling length adjusted for initial 
levels, i.e. taking any convergence towards a long-run steady state into account as 
suggested by the model.
9 The positive correlation is evident in the figure, which thus 
suggests that the lagging performance of countries such as Turkey, Venezuela and Costa 
Rica may be ascribed to low trust levels. Conversely, the strong relative improvements 
in schooling in Scandinavia, Canada and New Zealand coincide with above-average 
levels of social trust. The figure also indicates that Pakistan and South Korea may be 
outliers. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
8 As outlined in Table A1, the governance index is the average of all six Kaufman indices across all time 
periods. Although the indices are meant to measure different aspects of governance, they are highly 
correlated and therefore more likely measure an overall aspect of governance. The statistical validity of 
averaging is evident by Cronbach’s Alpha, which is 0.98 in the present sample of countries and 0.99 in 
the full 1996-2002 data set. 
9 Note that the figure on the y-axis is schooling growth adjusted for initial levels; i.e. the residual from 
regressing the growth of average schooling length on its initial 1960 level. 
  18However, a simple correlation with a single indicator is not evidence of a causal 
effect. Table 1 therefore presents the results of regressing the growth rate of the average 
length of schooling between 1960 and 2000 on initial levels of schooling in 1960, the 
logarithm to initial GDP per capita in 1960 and social trust using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The results first of all show that these variables have affected the growth of 
schooling as expected. The findings show a strong convergence effect, as countries with 
low initial levels of schooling catch up by achieving faster accumulation of education, 
and initial GDP per capita also receives a negative and strongly significant sign, which 
can be interpreted as evidence of the effect of high initial costs of investing in education 
in relatively rich countries (the w0 in the model). These findings are thus consistent with 
the predictions of the model in equation (8).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to the main point of this paper, the central implication of the model 
receives strong support in Table 1, as social trust emerges as an important determinant 
of the growth of schooling in the period 1960-2000. The table also presents the results 
of using the growth rate of the average schooling of female adults as the dependent 
variable, which shows the same pattern, although this is hardly surprising given the 
strong correlation between these dependent variables. Controlling for regional fixed 
effects reduces both coefficients as well as the significance of the coefficient on female 
schooling growth (columns 2 and 5) but does not affect the qualitative findings. 
Furthermore, to control for the possibility that the results are driven by a small group of 
  19outlier observations, columns 3 and 6 apply a robust regressions technique.
10 This 
alternative approach yields a slightly larger effect of social trust on average schooling 
growth and a substantially larger effect on the growth of female schooling. It can thus 
be concluded that the results obtained by simple OLS are not likely to be driven by 
outlier observations. Moreover, the results are easily interpretable within the framework 
of the simple model brought forward in section 2. 
Table 2 repeats the exercise with the growth of the share of the population with 
secondary schooling and the share of the population with a post-secondary education. 
The table shows that secondary schooling growth also seems to be associated with 
social trust with an effect comparable to that on average length of schooling. However, 
the growth of post-secondary schooling has clearly not been influenced by social trust. 
The former result is also robust to the inclusion of regional effects and weighting down 
potentially influential observations although the standardized coefficient obtained from 
robust regressions is rather large while the latter non-result is not influenced by outliers. 
The apparently significant effect in column 5 in fact turns out to be a result of outliers 
that is corrected for in the robust regression.
11
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
10 Robust regression takes the residuals of simple OLS and weights the influence of observations with 
large residuals down. Hence, if results were driven by a small group of outliers this procedure should 
make the coefficients on trust appear small and insignificant. 
11 The table does not report the results of estimating robust regressions with regional effects, as these 
results are in all cases virtually similar to those without such effects. Hence, the significance of social 
trust in column 5 is eradicated when a small number of outliers are weighted down by this technique. 
  20The findings thus provide support for the notion that social trust is associated with 
faster growth of average schooling and of secondary education, all other things being 
equal, i.e. the findings support the explanation proposed in the theoretical model. 
Furthermore, the results show that the effect of social trust is not driven by outlier 
observations. These results could nevertheless still be spurious due to two other factors. 
Firstly, they could be the result of omitted variables correlated with trust; and secondly, 
the findings could reflect the opposite casual direction, i.e. Knack and Keefer’s (1997) 
explanation that the growth of schooling has caused the current cross-country trust 
differences. The latter problem may be particularly relevant as the growth of schooling 
is measured in the period 1960-2000 while social trust is only measured in the latter half 
of the period. These problems are taken into account in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3 explores the robustness of the results to the inclusion of a set of control 
variables by performing a small EBA consisting of entering all combinations of one or 
two variables from a pool of eleven control variables, which gives a total of 66 
permutations. Following Levine and Renelt (1992), a result is deemed robust if the 
coefficient on the variable of interest remains of the same sign and is significant at the 
5% level throughout. Although more recent work by Sala-I-Martin (1997) has criticized 
the Levine-Renelt approach as being too restrictive, it is used in the following since 
variables passing this test will in all likelihood also pass Sala-I-Martin’s criteria. As 
outlined above, the EBA variables are the initial fertility rate, openness to trade, market 
distortions, income inequality, democratic tenure, population density, governments’ 
share of the economy, expenditure per student, GDP growth, average intelligence (IQ), 
and governance.  
  21Performing an EBA with these control variables firstly shows that the association 
between social trust and the growth of average schooling length is robust in an extreme 
bounds sense, as reported in Table 3: the effect of social trust remains positive 
throughout and only fails the 1% level in one case. Furthermore, the max-min ratio - the 
difference between the lower bound (the smallest estimate obtained in any specification) 
and the upper bound (the largest estimate obtained in any specification) - is 1.6, which 
compared to most EBA results is rather small. When turning to the growth of female 
average schooling length, the results are only slightly less precise, as social trust fails 
the 1% level in two cases and the max-min ratio is 1.9. With respect to the third 
dependent variable - the growth of the share of the population that has a secondary 
education - the result is also robust in the strong sense, although the inclusion of 
governance in general lowers the significance level to 5% while the max-min ratio is 
1.8. Hence, it does not seem likely that the results are caused by omitted variables 
although a few results from the EBA nevertheless need mention.  
It is worth noting that with all three dependent variables, the lower bound 
coefficients derive from specifications that include the measure of market distortions. It 
is also worth noting that economic growth is always significantly negative at 10% or 
better when the growth of average female schooling is the dependent variable. On 
average, specifications with economic growth also provide the highest estimates. 
Although puzzling, this result is consistent with e.g. Barro (1997) who finds that male 
schooling is positively associated while female schooling is negatively associated with 
growth, possibly because female schooling follows male schooling only with a lag. 
Expenditure per student on the other hand never approaches significance, implying that 
there is no evidence of any supply side effect on the growth of schooling. With respect 
  22to the last control variable to enter the EBA, it must be concluded that governance (or 
institutional quality) does not provide a transmission channel for trust, as it is never 
significant. It furthermore exerts no influence on the coefficient on trust, which in these 
specifications is virtually unchanged.
12 Surprisingly, the well-functioning of formal 
institutions seem unrelated to schooling growth. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, Table 4 addresses the issue of potential reverse causation. To sort out the 
direction of causality, an instrumental variables (IV) approach is adopted.
13 If it were 
the case that part of the significant association obtained from OLS is entirely due to the 
reverse causality, this procedure would reduce the size of the coefficient and render it 
insignificant. On the other hand, if there is a positive feedback effect, i.e. a two-way 
causation, it could be expected that the OLS estimates were downwards biased, in 
which case the IV-estimates would be larger than the OLS estimates. The choice of 
instrument is a measure of absence of corruption, which has been shown to be 
significantly associated with social trust (Uslaner, 2002) while there are neither 
                                                 
12 Alternative measures of expenditure such as educational expenditure as percentage of GDP and growth 
rates of these measures performed equally poorly in robustness analyses not reported here, thus failing to 
provide evidence of supply side effects, as found by other types of studies (Hanushek, 1986). With 
respect to governance, it should be noted that neither the single Kaufman indices nor alternative measures 
of institutional quality from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002) proved to exert any 
influence. 
13 Although Hausman tests fail to reject that social trust is exogenous, IV estimates are reported as the test 
is known to be rather weak and the test results are not particularly strong (Maddala, 1992). 
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The results of employing the instrument show that the effects of social trust are 
real and in the direction posited in the theoretical model, as trust remains significant at 
conventional levels and none of the IV estimates differ significantly from the simple 
OLS estimates. Hence, given that IV approaches can inform about causality at all, the 
results indicate that there probably is no reverse causal effect from the growth of 
schooling to social trust, thereby supporting the theoretical presumption that social 
capital in the form of trust has caused substantial improvements of education. The 
results are of economic significance, for example indicating that a positive shock to 
social trust of about 15 percentage points (one standard deviation) would have led to 
roughly 30% additional growth of average schooling during the 40-year period 
considered in this paper. As social trust is demonstrated to be robustly associated with 
schooling growth, the consequences for countries’ economic and human development 
                                                 
14 The instrument is valid, as it does not correlate with the residual from a regression without social trust 
but is strongly associated with such trust. The fit of the instrument in the first stage regression moreover 
easily passes Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb criteria for proper instruments (R
2=0.61; F=79.91). 
Although the variable is measured at the end of the period, this may not constitute a problem as 
corruption is often found to be remarkably stable over time (see e.g. Treisman, 2000). An alternative set 
of instruments including the Protestant share of population, ethnic diversity and a dummy for post-
communist countries yielded very similar results that can be obtained from the author. 
  24are therefore far from negligible. The potential implications of these findings are 
outlined in the concluding section. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the association between social trust and schooling, 
relating the former to the impressive improvements of schooling in most of the world 
since 1960. Firstly, the paper shortly outlined two conflicting views on the connection 
between social trust and education proposed by previous research. Showing that there 
appears to be an empirical association between levels of trust and education, one strand 
of the literature has suggested that increased schooling makes individuals more likely to 
trust other people (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997; Knack and Zak, 2002). Another strand 
has instead interpreted the association to be an effect of trust leading to a higher supply 
of education across countries (e.g. Coleman, 1988; la Porta et al., 1997; Putnam, 2000). 
After a review of these contrasting explanations, the paper explored a third potential 
mechanism, developing a simple theoretical model with endogenous investments in 
labour-augmenting technology. The model illustrated an alternative mechanism where 
firms’ demand for schooling increases as countries move towards more knowledge-
intensive production as a result of these investments. While this is a trivial insight, the 
model also illustrated how the response of schooling demand to changes in factor 
intensity may be stronger in high-trust societies where transaction costs associated with 
finding trustworthy educated employees are relatively low. Contrary to previous 
research, the theoretical channel proposed in the model therefore relies on a demand-
side effect that leads to a faster growth of schooling in high-trust societies. 
  25The paper thereafter tested whether this proposition can be found in real-life data. 
In a sample of 52 countries, the growth of schooling was measured by the percentage 
improvements between 1960 and 2000 in average schooling length, average female 
schooling length, the share of the population receiving a secondary education, and the 
share of the population receiving a post-secondary education. The results of regressing 
schooling growth on social trust, initial schooling and initial GDP per capita provided 
support for the proposition that trust is positively associated with improvements in 
education. The finding that social trust has caused the growth of average and secondary 
(but not post-secondary) schooling proved to be robust to controlling for potential 
omitted variables and to the exclusion of potentially confounding outliers. Using an 
instrumental variables approach moreover indicates that the findings are not the result of 
reverse causality, given that such approaches can inform about causality. Indeed, the 
OLS estimates seem unbiased, suggesting that there is no discernable effect of 
schooling growth on social trust, a finding that is contrary to interpretations of the trust-
education association in some previous studies. Furthermore, the effects are sufficiently 
large to warrant considerable economic interest. 
The empirical results suggest that investments in education are relatively cheaper 
in high-trust than in low-trust societies, which have led to faster growth of schooling in 
the former countries. The results therefore point to the possibility that part of the effect 
of social trust on economic growth identified in recent studies may be due to its effects 
on the accumulation of education. These findings could have implications for policy 
priorities, as low-trust countries may need to reconsider the balance between investing 
in schooling versus e.g. physical capital or infrastructure when trying to further their 
social and economic development, since trust influences how costly investments in 
  26schooling are. However, the findings also provide a negative implication by questioning 
that increased education leads to increased social trust. Since this paper rejects the 
finding of previous research that schooling is a determinant of trust, the potential for 
trust-enhancing policy identified in the recent literature remains sadly limited. 
As a final remark, it must be stressed that this is a first foray into the topic and the 
paper consequently asks as well as answers questions. In particular, the empirical 
evidence does not contain information on whether the transaction costs channel 
suggested in the theoretical model is in fact one of the underlying factors driving the 
results. As such, future research could for example investigate whether social trust 
actually affects search costs in the labour market as assumed in the model, as well as re-
examine the perhaps controversial conclusion that investments in education do not 
affect the levels of social trust. Given the present knowledge of the consequences of 
trust, the returns to research in the social and institutional determinants of both trust and 
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The implications with respect to the steady state investment and income levels 
follow directly from solving firms’ maximization problem. The growth of schooling 
follows from the steady state level in equation A1 that can also be derived directly from 
the maximization problem. It can easily be shown that equation A2 is positive for values 
of y that are above the limit set out in equation A3. This is readily interpretable as a 
condition stating that the overall general level of development, w0, may need to be 
above a certain bound in order to make it rational for firms to employ an educated 
workforce. Hence, only when this condition is satisfied does the model replicate the 
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  28The condition referred to in a footnote on when a poverty trap appears in the 
model is outlined in equation A4. Finally, if there is no public and service sectors, it 
implies that n=1-m if e.g. the model is thought of as an overlapping generations (OLG) 
model. It is here important to note that firms in monopolistic competition are too small 
to take this equality into account. Given the structure of an OLG model where 
individuals live for two periods and invest in education in the first period, one can solve 
for the equilibrium level of w0. Equation A5 thus follows from the maximization 
problem and the poverty trap in equation A3 arises as an effect of fast discounting of the 
future. More specifically, it can easily be shown that the poverty trap arises when 
equation A6 is fulfilled. In the poverty trap, the economy is thus trapped in a corner 
solution of the model where schooling cannot fall below zero or some preset limit. This 
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Table 1. Social trust and growth of average schooling 
Growth variable  Average schooling length  Female average schooling length 
          1  2 3 4  5 6
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  Robust  OLS  OLS  Robust 




































Regional dummies  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations              52 52 51 50 50 50
Adjusted R square  0.710  0.784  0.923  0.689  0.751  0.887 
F statistic  42.694  27.381  20.4568  37.115  22.111  128.927 
Note: all regressions include a constant term; coefficients are standardized; t-statistics in parentheses; *** denotes significance at p<0.01; ** at p<0.05; * at p<0.10.  
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Table 2. Social trust and growth of additional schooling 
Growth variable  Secondary schooling  Post-secondary education 
          1  2 3 4  5 6
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  Robust  OLS  OLS  Robust 




































Regional dummies  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations              50 50 50 48 48 48
Adjusted R square  0.500  0.591  0.886  0.296  0.402  0.528 
F statistic  17.353  11.130  127.880  7.958  5.507  18.509 
Note: all regressions include a constant term; coefficients are standardized; t-statistics in parentheses; *** denotes significance at p<0.01; ** at p<0.05; * at p<0.10. 
   
 
 
  37Growth variable  Average schooling length  Female average schooling length  Secondary schooling 
  Lower bound  Upper bound  Lower bound  Upper bound  Lower bound  Upper bound 




































Note: all regressions include a constant term; coefficients are standardized; t-statistics in parentheses; *** denotes significance at p<0.01; ** at p<0.05; * at p<0.10. 
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Table 4. Social trust and growth of schooling, IV estimates 





 1  3  5 
Estimation method  IV  IV
  IV
 


















Observations 50  48  48 
Adjusted R square  0.688  0.661  0.465 
F statistic  37.806  32.256  14.883 
Note: all regressions include a constant term; coefficients are standardized; t-statistics in parentheses; *** 
denotes significance at p<0.01; ** at p<0.05; * at p<0.10. The instrument for social trust in IV-estimation 
is absence of corruption. 40
      Name Source Definition
Average schooling length  Barro and Lee (2001)  Average number of years adults over age 25 attended school; initial level is 1960. 
Average female schooling length  Barro and Lee (2001)  Average number of years female adults over age 25 attended school; initial level is 1960. 
Secondary schooling  Barro and Lee (2001)  Share of population with secondary schooling; initial level is 1960. 
Post-secondary schooling  Barro and Lee (2001)  Share of population with tertiary schooling; initial level is 1960. 
Schooling growth  Barro and Lee (2001)  Percentage growth of one of four schooling measures, 1960-2000. 
GDP per capita  Heston, Summers & Aten (2002)  GDP per capita, purchasing power adjusted. For a description of the approach, see Summers 
and Heston (1991). 
Social trust  Inglehart, Basañez & Moreno 
(1998) 
Percentage of population saying yes to “In general, do you think most people can be trusted 
or can’t you be too careful?” These data are supplemented in two cases (Costa Rica and 
Ecuador) with similar data from the ongoing Danish Social Capital project. All are averages 
of all available observations. 
Fertility rate  World Bank (2003)  Number of children born per woman, 1960. 
Openness Heston  et al. (2002)  Export plus imports as % of GDP, purchasing power adjusted. 
Market distortions  Heston et al. (2002)  Price of investments relative to the US, purchasing power adjusted. 
Inequality  Deininger and Squire (1996)  Income inequality measured by Gini coefficient. 
Democratic tenure  Gwartney and Lawson (2001)  Number of years country has been democratic in period 1960-2000. 
Population density  World Bank (2003)  Average number of inhabitants per square kilometre. 
Government share of economy  Heston et al. (2002)  Share of government activities in GDP. 
Expenditure per student  World Bank (2003)  Average expenditure per student enrolled in primary school. 
GDP growth  Heston et al. (2002)  Average yearly percentage growth of GDP, purchasing power adjusted. 
Average IQ  Lynn and Vanhanen (2002)  Average intelligence obtained from intelligence tests. 
Governance  Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
Average of six indicators of good governance across all available time periods. 
Absence of corruption  Transparency International (2003)  Absence of corruption measured from 0 (all-pervasive corruption) to 10 (no corruption). 
Table A1. Variable sources and definitions 
 
 Table A2. Descriptive statistics 
Name Mean  Standard  deviation  Observations 
Average schooling, 1960  5.02  2.39  52 
Average female schooling, 1960  4.64  2.57  50 
Secondary schooling, 1960  9.99  8.77  50 
Post- secondary schooling, 1960  2.25  2.15  50 
Average schooling growth  .89  .84  52 
Female schooling growth  1.41  1.94  50 
Secondary schooling growth  3.50  3.29  48 
Post-secondary schooling growth  6.05  4.86  48 
GDP per capita  5,699  3,724  52 
Social trust  29.20  14.93  52 
Fertility rate  4.21  1.92  50 
Openness 53.39  33.97  52 
Market distortions  -0.08  0.29  52 
Inequality 37.19  10.20  48 
Democratic tenure  25.81  13.29  52 
Population density  141.51  197.71  52 
Government share of economy  16.68  6.90  52 
Expenditure per student  14.55  6.89  48 
GDP growth  0.10  0.10  52 
Average IQ  93.46  8.09  52 
Governance 0.75  0.86  52 
Absence of corruption  5.57  2.50  51 
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Table A3. Countries and social trust scores 
Country Trust  Country Trust 
Argentina                   20.8  Italy                       31.4 
Australia                   43.8  Japan                       42.9 
Austria                     32.8  Malta                       20.7 
Bangladesh                  22.2  Mexico                      25.1 
Belgium                     31.4  Netherlands                 53.9 
Brazil                       4.8  New Zealand                 49.1 
Bulgaria                    28.6  Norway                      63.9 
Canada                      46.9  Pakistan                    25.7 
Chile                       22.5  Peru                         7.8 
Colombia                    10.8  Philippines                  6.9 
Costa Rica                   7.4  Poland                      23.7 
Croatia                     21.0  Portugal                    15.7 
Czech Republic              27.5  Romania                     14.9 
Denmark                     60.1  Slovakia                    21.9 
Dominican Republic          26.4  Slovenia                    18.2 
Ecuador                      8.9  South Africa                22.2 
El Salvador                 14.6  South Korea                 32.5 
Finland                     56.4  Spain                       33.6 
France                      23.3  Sweden                      62.3 
Germany                     36.1  Switzerland                 42.1 
Ghana                       22.4  Taiwan                      38.2 
Greece                      23.7  Turkey                      10.4 
Hungary                     25.6  United Kingdom              36.9 
Iceland                     41.5  Uruguay                     22.1 
India                       38.3  USA                         42.1 
Ireland                     41.2  Venezuela                   14.8 
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